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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
STATE OF NEW YORK. 
Respondent, 
-and- CASE NOS. U-9293 
and U-9299 
JEFFREY J. SATZ. 
Charging Party. 
JOSEPH M. BRESS, ESQ.. for Respondent 
JEFFREY J. SATZ. p_ro se 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of Jeffrey J. 
Satz (Charging Party) to the dismissal by the Director of 
Public Employment Practices and Representation (Director) of 
two charges filed against the State of New York (State) which 
alleged that the Department of Labor, in concert with the 
Department of Civil Service, violated §209-a.l(a). (c) and 
(d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act). The 
dismissal was based upon the Director's determination that 
the charges were deficient, in that they failed to state a 
cause of action which, even if proven, would constitute a 
violation of the Act. 
FACTS 
Charging Party filed improper practice charges against 
the New York State Department of Labor and New York State 
Department of Civil Service, in his own name, asserting that 
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the Respondent, over a period of years, failed to reclassify 
manpower programs coordinators, while creating a "New 
Missions" program, which has as its purpose the recruitment 
and retention of minority employees in the Department of 
Labor. Charging Party asserts that, as a result of the 
combination of these two developments, he. as well as other 
persons similarly situated, are subject to layoff in 
violation of their seniority rights. 
Charging Party asserts that during the course of 
numerous labor/management meetings management representatives 
stated their intention to file a request for reclassification 
of manpower programs coordinators, but that the request was 
delayed in response to pressure from groups interested in 
affirmative action by the Department of Labor. Although 
Charging Party makes the allegation that he is being 
discriminated against to discourage his participation in the 
activities of his employee organization, he asserts no facts 
to support the claim. The charges, insofar as they allege 
violations of §209-a.l(a) and (c) were, accordingly, 
dismissed by the Director. 
As to that portion of the charges alleging a violation 
of §209-a.l(d) of the Act, the Director dismissed the charge 
upon the ground that the Charging Party named himself in his 
individual capacity, and that only an employee organization, 
and not an individual, has standing to file a charge pursuant 
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to §209-a.l(d). In his exceptions, the Charging Party-
asserts that he holds certain official positions within his 
employee organization, the Public Employees Federation (PEF), 
but does not assert that he has the authority to act on 
behalf of his employee organization with respect to the 
filing of charges with this Board, or that he was acting as 
the agent of PEF at the time the charges were originally 
filed. 
DISCUSSION 
Although Charging Party asserts that he is a PEF 
steward. Division Council Leader and Executive Board Member, 
he does not assert that he has actual or apparent authority, 
by virtue of those official capacities, to act as PEF's agent 
or representative for the purpose of filing improper practice 
charges with this Board. In the absence of any claim that 
the Public Employees Federation is the charging party in 
fact, we find that the Director correctly dismissed so much 
of the charges as alleged a violation of §209-a.l(d) of the 
Act.-7 
As to the allegations of violation of §209-a.l(a) and 
(c) of the Act, we agree with the Director that the charges 
essentially allege a job preference for minority persons in 
violation of Charging Party's seniority rights under the 
collective bargaining agreement between PEF and the State of 
1/Brunswick CSD. 19 PERB ir3063 (1986). 
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New York. We agree with the Director that breach of contract 
allegations do not fall within PERB's jurisdiction pursuant 
to §205.5(d). and we further agree that this Board is without 
jurisdiction of the charges insofar as they may relate to 
unlawful racial discrimination or preference. Additionally, 
Charging Party's assertion that his layoff would deprive his 
union constituents of his representation does not set forth a 
claim under either §209-a.l(a) or (c) of the Act. Finally, 
since he makes no factual allegations that the failure to 
timely reclassify the manpower programs coordinator series 
and the institution of the New Missions program were done for 
the purpose of effectuating his layoff because of anti-union 
animus. Charging Party•s claim must be dismissed in this 
regard as well. 
NOW. THEREFORE. WE ORDER that the charges herein be. and 
they hereby are. dismissed in their 
entirety. 
DATED: July 24, 1987 
Albany, New York 
/ Harold R. Newman. Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg. Member 
*>iiO 11090 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
COUNTY OF NASSAU (POLICE DEPARTMENT), 
Respondent, 
-and- CASE NO. U-9108 
PATROLMEN'S BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION OF 
THE POLICE DEPARTMENT OF THE COUNTY OF 
NASSAU. INC.. 
Charging Party. 
BEE. DE ANGELIS & EISMAN. ESQS. (PETER A. BEE, ESQ. 
of Counsel), for Respondent 
AXELROD. CORNACHIO & FAMIGHETTI, ESQS. (MICHAEL C. 
AXELROD. ESQ., of Counsel), for Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the 
Charging Party. Patrolmen's Benevolent Association of the 
Police Department of the County of Nassau. Inc. (PBA) to the 
dismissal of its charge against the County of Nassau (Police 
Department) (County), which alleged that the County had 
violated §209-a.l(a). (b). (c) and (d) of the Taylor Law. 
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissed the charge prior 
to hearing upon the ground that it failed to set forth 
allegations which, even if proven, would constitute a 
violation of the Taylor Law. 
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PBA filed a three-count charge against the County, on or 
about December 8, 1986. Thereafter, it requested withdrawal 
of Count "A" of the charge and the request was granted. As 
to Counts "B" and "C". the ALJ. following the pre-hearing 
conference, summarized the multi-page Details of Charges, 
without objection, as follows: 
As to Count B, the gravamen of the charge is 
that the County unilaterally changed the 
description of duties it provides to the [New 
York State Policemen's and Firemen's] Retirement 
System regarding injured officers who have 
applied for disability retirement, in that it 
previously provided a description outlining 
duties of police officers generally, whereas it 
now provides a description of the "light duty" 
assignment to which the injured officer has been 
"permanently assigned" as a result of the 
injury. As a result, it is asserted, many 
applications for disability retirement which had 
routinely been granted are now being rejected. 
It is also alleged that the County has refused a 
demand to negotiate the contents of said "job 
descriptions." The right of the County to 
reassign injured officers to "restricted" or 
"light" duty is not at issue. 
Under Count C, it is alleged that the County 
has abused the internal procedures it utilizes to 
determine whether, under §207-c of the General 
Municipal Law. an injured officer is to be 
certified to return to duty, and has ordered such 
return to duty prematurely, causing detriment to 
the terms and conditions of employment of the 
affected officers. (January 13, 1987 letter from 
ALJ Toomey to parties.) 
The ALJ found that, as to Count B, the employer has the 
management prerogative to determine its method of complying 
with requirements placed upon it by outside agencies and its 
determination is accordingly not mandatorily negotiable. The 
ALJ therefore dismissed Count B of the charge in this regard. 
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As to Count C. the ALJ also found that the County has 
the right to determine how it will conduct its own 
investigation of employees on sick leave and who will be 
ordered to return to work, so long as employee participation 
is not required. The ALJ points out in his decision that 
"it is not alleged that the County changed existing 
procedures which involved employees, or that it refused to 
negotiate alternate procedures or the impact of the in-issue 
actions." (Footnote 2 [sic] of ALJ decision.) 
In its exceptions, PBA characterizes Count B as a 
charge which alleges "a unilateral change in the description 
of job duties provided to the New York State Policemen's and 
Firemen's Retirement System for disability retirement 
purposes", and characterizes Count C as alleging, as 
violative of the Act. the actions of the employer in 
"unilaterally ordering an injured police officer to return 
to duty prior to when they otherwise are advised by their 
personal physician . . . ." (Exception No. 2 to ALJ 
decision.) 
In essence. Count B asserts that the County may not 
alter the description of duties provided to the Retirement 
System without negotiation with PBA. PBA does not assert 
that the County does not have a duty to provide a 
description of job duties to the Retirement System, nor does 
it assert that the descriptions provided by the County are 
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inaccurate. It simply asserts that the County's previous 
practice was to provide a copy of the general job 
description for police officers in connection with 
disability retirement applications, while the current 
practice is to describe the actual "light" duties being 
performed by the specific police officer whose disability 
retirement application is under consideration. Presumably, 
the police officer-applicant has the opportunity to correct 
inadequacies or inaccuracies in the description of duties 
performed to the Retirement System as part of his/her 
application as well as under the hearing and review 
procedures of the Retirement System. 
We find that the ALJ properly concluded that the County 
has no duty to negotiate with the PBA concerning the 
submissions which it makes to the New York State Policemen's 
and Firemen's Retirement System, this matter being within 
the prerogatives of management. 
As to Count C. the charge, as clarified, contains no 
allegation that the County has changed its procedure for 
determining when, and under what circumstances, an injured 
police officer should be required to return to duty, but 
contends that the County is more stringently applying its 
procedures than it has in the past. It is well settled, as 
found by the ALJ. that a public employer has the right 
unilaterally to implement internal procedures to 
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insure compliance with attendance rules, where employee 
participation is not required. To the extent that an 
employer resorts to procedures already in place to insure 
compliance with, for example, attendance requirements, the 
employer is exercising a management prerogative, and has no 
duty to negotiate on this subject.— 
Having fully considered the exceptions of the Charging 
Party to the dismissal of the charge, we nevertheless 
conclude that the decision of the Administrative Law Judge 
should be affirmed, and WE THEREFORE ORDER that the charge 
be, and it hereby is, dismissed in its entirety. 
DATED: July 24. 1987 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
i/County of Nassau. 18 PERB 1[4597 (1985) and cases 
cited therein. 
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